La presente contribución atiende a la interpretación por parte de Heidegger de la dualidad planteada expresamente por Kant de facultades cognoscitivas y sus respectivos tipos específicos de representación. Intentará mostrar cómo su interpretación fenomenológica da cuenta de esta cooriginariedad de sensibilidad y entendimiento y puede incluso –en un sentido bien determinado– legitimarla. Para ello enfoca su interés en el posicionamiento crítico de Heidegger frente a la lectura neokantiana de este elemento doctrinal de la filosofía transcendental de Kant.

Escribir hoy en día un libro sobre hermenéutica, que tal hermenéutica se refiera a la desarrollada por G. Gadamer en su conocido Verdad y método y que se pretenda añadir algo nuevo a lo mucho escrito sobre el tema parecería, a primera vista, empresa irrealizable. Que ambas pretensiones inspiren la sólida monografía de María G. Navarro —titulada Interpretar y argumentar— constituye empresa audaz y arriesgada, plena de coraje innovador, que provoca admiración, curiosidad e interés. Contra lo que pudiera parecer a (...) primera vista, el libro contiene un alto componente de originalidad y creatividad, debido a la estratagema metodoló-gica de que se sirve la autora. A saber, una hermenéutica in obliquo, estrategia consistente en interpretar a la hermenéutica gadameriana a través del prisma de la lógica de la argumentación. (shrink)

Reseña del libro: Martin Heidegger y Karl Löwith, Briefwechsel. 1919–1973 -/- .

El cristianismo, obligado por la Modernidad, tuvo que hacer un desplazamiento desde el plano dogmático al plano moral; hoy estamos ante otro desplazamiento: el que va desde el terreno moral al místico. En este terreno dominará sobre todo la experiencia personal de la presencia salvífica de Dios en Cristo. Esa experiencia, vivida en medio del pluralismo, consistirá en una síntesis activa entre la Presencia y su interpretación . Este ensayo trata de diseccionar las dimensiones existenciales y lingüísticas de esa síntesis. (...) Después de ver por qué somos pobres en experiencia, se analizan los componentes y caracteres esenciales de toda experiencia religiosa A continuación se disecciona la estructura simbólica de esta experiencia , y su configuración mítico-narrativa Palabras clave: 'Hermenéutica de los símbolos'; 'Mitos'; 'Mundos ficcionales'; 'Hermenéutica narrativa'; 'Mundo del texto'; 'Apropiación del sentido'.Christianity forced by modernity had to make a shift from a dogmatic plane to a moral one; today, there is another shift which goes from a moral to a mystical ground. The personal experience of God’s saving presence in Christ will dominate, over all, in this field. That experience, lived in the midst of pluralism will consist of an active synthesis between the presence and its interpretation .This essay intends to dissect the linguistic and existential dimensions of this synthesis. After seeing why we are poor in experience, we will analyze the essential components and characteristics of the religious experience , and its mythical narrative configuration. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Defending a Phenomenological–Behavioral Perspective: Culture, Behavior, and ExperienceMarino Pérez-Álvarez (bio), José M. García-Montes (bio), Adolfo J. Cangas (bio), and Louis A. Sass (bio)KeywordsBehavior, contextual phenomenology, culture, experienceWe should like to express our sincere thanks to all the authors for their commentaries on our articles. Given the restrictions of space (a limitation they too had to contend with), we can only respond to a few aspects of their (...) interesting remarks. We shall reply of course on the basis of our own approach—an approach that sets out to integrate culture, behavior, and experience, and that might be termed contextual phenomenology, phenomenological behaviorism, or perhaps most accurately (albeit more awkwardly), the phenomenological–behavioral perspective.In her commentary, Ibáñez-Guerra (2008), referring to the target articles “Phenomenology and behaviorism” (Pérez-Álvarez, Sass, and Cangas 2008) and “The role of superstition in psychopathology” (García-Montes et al. 2008), wonders whether our maintaining of the spirit of Skinner, as well as our recourse to phenomenology, might not themselves represent forms of superstitious behavior. She points out that it is not always a good idea to put new wine in old barrels. For her, the new wine and new barrels would be represented by social constructivism, of which she is reminded by some aspects of our work. But in making her own case, Ibáñez-Guerra (2008) reveals certain common prejudices concerning behaviorism, prejudices that have apparently persisted even after reading our article. Thus, for example, she does not see operant behavior as incorporating intentionality (what, in the target article, is presented in terms of final causality), because she assumes that intentionality would necessarily imply a mentalist and dualist notion involving a supposed internal mental entity that causes behavior. Skinner (1974) himself noted and rejected this very assumption in a passage that clearly distinguishes his own approach from what he calls a “stimulus-response formula”: “Possibly no charge,” he wrote,is more often leveled against behaviorism or a science of behavior than that it cannot deal with purpose or intention. A stimulus-response formula has no answer, but operant behavior is the very field of purpose and [End Page 281] intention. By its nature it is directed toward the future: a person acts in order that something will happen, and the order is temporal.(pp. 55–6)The place Skinner gives to intentionality and purpose is elaborated in our target article.Furthermore, Ibáñez-Guerra (2008) assumes that, on methodological grounds, Skinner rejects all that is not observable, or at least that cannot be operationalized. This, however, is simply incorrect, at least as regards Skinner’s radical behaviorism. As the reader may recall, radical (as opposed to methodological) behaviorism is neither operationalist nor does it reject private or subjective events because of their unobservability. Indeed, Skinner specifically acknowledges that such events are in fact observable—at least for one person: the subject him- or herself. The question for Skinner is to understand how the part of the world that is only observable and experiential for oneself is constructed or formed. In the end, it turns out that radical behaviorism is more radical, in the Aristotelian ontological sense (see Pérez-Alvarez, Sass, and García-Montes 2008), than post-modern constructionism. Indeed, as we remarked, radical behaviorism can still surprise us today. Similarly, phenomenology is starting to be missed in the clinical context (Andreasen 2007). We believe that radical behaviorism and phenomenology, mutually readjusted, are in fact excellent wines for the times we live in—if only we knew how to appreciate them.In their commentary on “Phenomenology and behaviorism: A mutual readjustment,” Fletcher and Hayes (2008) argue that the philosophy and theory of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT)/Relational Frame Theory (RFT) already contain the salutary aspects of phenomenology that we highlight in our target article. Their insistence on reducing the affinities we find between phenomenology and behaviorism to ACT/RFT consists, in our view, in a scientific–technical argument that is more scientistic than strictly philosophical in nature. Their insistence on the scientific–technical argument itself implies an unclarified philosophical assumption. On what grounds do experimental data constitute the last word? Has... (shrink)

Considers whether psychology can be established as a scientific discipline, briefly looks at the history of psychology, and attempts to clarify the nature of truth.

Here we defend the view that one ought to categorize and classify at least some mental disorders as clusters of interrelated dysfunctions of (usually, several) cognitive capacities – that is, the kinds of capacities that are postulated in cognitive science; capacities that are understood as entities that are primarily individuated in cognitive-functional terms (CF-systems); systems that have a set of peculiar properties in their manner of operation when processing information or representations. Usually, some of the mental disorders postulated in psychiatry (...) are clinically heterogeneous with respect to their symptoms, and tend to be comorbid – that is, one disorder is often accompanied by other disorders – for example, schizophrenia often comes with major depression. We argue that describing the manner in which CF-systems operate within themselves and with other CF-systems as well as with stimuli and other kinds of information can best explain why certain mental disorders are very heterogeneous with respect to their symptoms, and why comorbidity is so frequent among these disorders. A consequence is that both within-category heterogeneity and comorbodity are not necessarily indications of defective classifications but are rather a consequence of the actual cognitive functional architecture itself and are therefore to be expected in these cases. (shrink)

Este artículo de homenaje a la Profesora Yolanda Ruano se divide en dos partes. En la primera discuto las críticas que ella realizara a mi libro sobre la diosa Fortuna en las que avanzaba su propio análisis de las complejas relaciones entre razón y fortuna en el pensamiento occidental. En la segunda parte, desde el punto de vista del “giro icónico” en humanidades y ciencias sociales, analizo el caso concreto del auge y desaparición de la diosa Fortuna en la iconografía (...) política de la ciudad de Berlín. A lo largo del siglo XIX la diosa Fortuna desaparece de la escena berlinesa y es sustituida por la diosa Niké o Victoria, que popularmente se interpreta como un Ángel de la Victoria. Este es el marco de la infancia de Walter Benjamin, quien más tarde expresará su visión de la historia con un otro ángel completamente distinto, el Angelus Novus de Paul Klee. (shrink)

This article attempts to show the importance of the concept of superstition in understanding a range of psychological problems. With this aim, we critically analyze several constructs that, without actually using the term “superstition,” concern this phenomenon and its role in the development of mental disorders. First we discuss “Thought–Action Fusion” and “magical thinking,” two concepts from the cognitive tradition that view superstition as basically an ideational phenomenon. Second, we look at “Experiential Avoidance,” a post-Skinnerian concept that understands superstition as (...) a type of avoidance behavior for certain private events. Third, we discuss superstition as an emotional phenomenon, in particular, Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenological analysis of emotions as magical operations. Finally, we review a cultural approach to superstition and its influence on psychopathology. In this perspective, superstition is seen as a cultural form linked to the historical–social context, which is fostered by certain social practices or institutions, including (perhaps surprisingly) certain features of modernity. (shrink)